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This article draws parallels between Tsar Nicholas I and current Russian President Vladimir
Putin with respect to their use of nationalism to justify statist policies and political
authoritarianism. Building upon insights by Alexander Gerschenkron about the economic
development of “backwards” states, it argues that both Nicholas and Putin have rhetori-
cally used Western concepts such as nationalism and democracy to legitimize their rule
but have modiﬁed them to give them more statist content. Under Nicholas, this was
exempliﬁed in the tripartite (Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality) Ofﬁcial Nationality
policy. Putin has emphasized patriotism, power, and statism to justify centralization of
power and authoritarian policies. Putin’s policies and rhetoric are strong analogs to those
of Nicholas. Ultimately, the goal of this paper is to explain state-inspired Russian nation-
alism and how it has been aligned with authoritarian politics, as well as specifying simi-
larities between present and past in Russia.
Copyright  2013, Asia-Paciﬁc Research Center, Hanyang University. Production and
hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction a KGB agent and desire to emulate his former boss, YuriMuch attention has been devoted to the issue of how
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sia-Paciﬁc Research Center, HaAndropov, a former spy-chief who sought to modernize and
save the Soviet system (Gessen, 2012). The search for histor-
ical analogs to explain contemporary Soviet/Russian leaders,
has, of course, a venerable history, with the Ivan IV–Stalin
pairing perhaps the most well-known (Yanov, 1981).
This article aims to give more content to the at-times
simplistic label of Putin as the newest in the long line of
Russian tsars, who, it should be emphasized, varied greatly
in terms of the style and substance of their rule. While it is
clear that Putin is not a Westernizing liberal, it is also
apparent that comparisons to Stalin or Ivan IV are grossly
exaggerated.2 Despite his roots in St. Petersburg, the2 While one can point to repressive aspects of contemporary Russia, it
is not a totalitarian state based on widespread terror. For a fantasy/
ﬁctional work that advances the notion that Russia may soon resemble
aspects of Ivan IV’s Russia, see Sorokin (2011). Putin is also not seeking to
restore Soviet communism. His famous quote is “He who does not regret
the break-up of the Soviet Union has no heart; he who wants to revive it
in its previous form has no head.”
nyang University. Production and hosting by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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This article instead ﬁnds an interesting and insightful par-
allel between Putin and Nicholas I (1825–1855), the “Iron
Tsar.” Like Putin, Nicholas was conservative, insofar as he
valued the old order and was against sweeping reforms to
transform Russia or re-make it in theWestern image. At the
same time, however, he faced a crisis and had to bow to
certain political realities, making some rhetorical nods to
new political ideas andmovements, in particular the notion
of nationalism. However, he adapted these ideas to suit his
own agenda, giving them a highly statist character. Putin
has done the same, both in terms of invoking nationalism
and modifying the idea of “democracy” in accordance with
his own priorities. The result, in both cases, was the
adoption of some elements of contemporary political
discourse but very little of its substance, particularly with
respect to political liberalization.
This article will explore aspects of Nicholas’ and Putin’s
rule, focusing on the use of nationalism and efforts to
preserve and even extend state power. In both cases,
leaders invoke history and aspects of Russian exception-
alism to both deﬁne the Russian nation and justify
authoritarian rule. In this way, they can be viewed as
innovative, albeit with the aim of preserving much of the
old order. Like Nicholas, however, Putin is ﬁnding that such
a strategy is not cost-free and is arguably having dimin-
ishing returns.
2. Russia, “backwardness,” and statist adaptation
The basis of the comparison in this paper rests on a
fundamental insight made by Alexander Gerschenkron in
his classic work, Economic Backwardness in Historical
Perspective (Gerschenkron, 1962). Gerschenkron’s funda-
mental thesis is that late modernizers – states that are
“backwards” compared to themost “advanced” states –will
follow a distinct development path, one that tends to
“differ fundamentally from that of an advanced country”
(Gerschenkron, 1962, 7). In his examination of the organi-
zational structures of industrialization in more “back-
wards” states such as Germany, Bulgaria and Russia,
Gerschenkron notes that they do not have to be innovators
in order to experience economic development. True, they
are playing “catch up” and their development in many re-
spects will be behind that of the leading states, but they can
also develop relatively quickly as they do not have to wait
and see what works and what does not. They can simply
borrow and adapt what the innovators have already done.
This is the classic “advantage of backwardness.” Moreover,
and this is the crucial element for our purposes, the most
efﬁcient method of development is to employ the power
and resources of the state. There is little need (or, for that
matter, ability) to experiment with various ideas or develop
an independent entrepreneurial class or open markets. The
blueprint for development at a given stage has already been3 Such comparisons were made in the early 2000s, when it appeared
that Putin might put Russia on aWesternizing course (see Bohlen (2002)).
However, that course has, in crucial respects been abandoned, and Putin’s
conservatism and embrace of the Orthodox faith, which we detail in this
paper, deviates signiﬁcantly from the main aspects of Peter’s reforms.crafted. The state, as the most powerful organization in
these countries and the only one with coercive power, can
then marshal the necessary resources for building the
infrastructure to foster development. The classic example,
in the Soviet case, was the use of the mass production
techniques of Ford and Taylor, albeit under a regime of state
planning and ownership.
The net result, in Gerschenkron’s analysis of late 19th–
early 20th century economic development, is that “back-
wards” states will adapt aspects of the economic system
from themore developed states. However, the two societies
are not mirror images of each other. Development in
“backwards” states will take on a decidedly statist cast,
with certain repercussions, including less likelihood for
political liberalization.
Our analysis borrows from Gerschenkron, but we are
more interested in how a “backwards” state adapts po-
litical ideas that originally developed elsewhere. Ger-
schenkron himself acknowledges that the intellectual
climate surrounding development will differ between an
advanced and “backwards” state, with a “New Deal in
emotions” required in the latter case (Gerschenkron,
1962, 25). Our interest is less in ideas of economic
development (e.g. socialism) and more in nationalism,
which became an important political force in the French
Revolution and offered a potential challenge to Tsarist
rule in early 19th century Russia, and liberal democracy,
which became an important norm in the late 20th cen-
tury but has been seen by Putin as problematic in the
Russian case. Nicholas I would eventually embrace
nationalism and Putin claims to be building democracy in
Russia, but each leader (re)deﬁned these terms to suit
their particular needs. Furthermore, as Gerschenkron
found in the case of economic development, in both cases
these ideas, originally invoked by liberals against the
power of the state, assumed a statist character. Let us now
turn to the development of Russian nationalism under
Nicholas I.
3. Nicholas I’s experience with nationalism
The French Revolution, with its ideas of liberty and
popular sovereignty, signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced developments
in Russia prior to and early in Nicholas’s reign. Tsarist
Russia, of course, did not welcome the events in Paris and
fought against revolutionary France in the Napoleonic
Wars. However, this conﬂict dramatically expanded con-
sciousness of Russian nationhood. Russian elites aban-
doned French and began to speak Russian. The military
took soldiers from a wide array of social strata, forming a
more cohesive Russian identity under the common cause of
rejecting Napoleon’s forces (Billington, 2004, 7–9). The
“sense of what it meant to be Russian” was intensiﬁed and
the war “awoke the Russian people to life” (Hosking, 2001,
259). Even as they were ﬁghting Napoleon, soldiers
exposed to the ideas of the French Revolution during the
1813–1815 campaign in Central and Western Europe found
much to admire in patriotic movements, representative
institutions, and the rule of law (Hosking, 2001, 260). Upon
return to Russia many former soldiers spearheaded orga-
nizations and secret societies to press for changes to the
4 There is, of course, a rich literature on the development of nation-
alism. Classic references are Kohn (1944), Gellner (1983), and Greenfeld
(1992).
5 One of the most powerful statements with respect to this conception
of nationalism comes from Italian nationalist Giuseppe Mazzini’s Duties of
Man, in which the Italian working class is told, “Do not beguile yourselves
with the hope of emancipation from unjust social conditions if you do not
ﬁrst conquer a Country for yourselves” (Brown, Nardin, and Rengger
(2002), 481).
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organization wrote that “we were the children of 1812”
(Figes, 2002, 72).
The push for political reform in Russia reached its
apogee in December 1825, during the coronation of Nich-
olas I, when nobles and ofﬁcers favoring reform staged an
abortive coup. The Decembrists, as this group would later
be called, encompassed a diverse range of views, but in the
main they embraced the “Spirit of the Age” that demanded
constitutional government. The fact that Russia would have
to borrow ideas from others was fully acknowledged. In the
words of N.I. Turgenev, “everything that must hencefor-
ward ﬂourish in her [Russia’s] midst she must perforce
borrow from Europe, she could never graft anything on her
own ancient institutions” (Schapiro, 1967, 25). The De-
cembrists, however, were poorly organized and their
rebellion was fairly easily put down.
The most important effect of the Decembrist Rebellion –
and, one might add, that was re-enforced by the nationalist
uprising in Poland in 1830–1831 – was how it put the new
Tsar, Nicholas I, on a path of “unrelenting reaction”
(Burleigh, 2005, 171). Against the opinion of his advisors,
Nicholas published a manifesto in July 1826 regarding his
personal feelings toward the Decembrists. He portrayed
them as “monsters,” inspired by foreign ideas and destined
to be rejected by the Russian people (narod) who are
naturally inclined to embrace monarchy. He maintained
that
The heart of Russia has remained and will always
remain inaccessible to [them]. The name of Russia will
not be disgraced by treason to Throne and Fatherland.
On the contrary, We saw on this occasion new examples
of devotion.In a state where love for the Monarch and
devotion to the Throne are based on natural traits of the
people, where there exist laws native to the land and a
ﬁrm rule, all the efforts of evil doers will be futile and
mad: they can conceal themselves in darkness, but at
their ﬁrst appearance, rejected by common indignation,
they will be crushed by the might of the law.
(Riasanovsky, 1959, 125–126)
This manifesto laid the groundwork for Nicholas’ con-
struction of the Russian people as authority-loving, thereby
modifying growing norms of popular sovereignty in such a
way that maintained the authoritarian status quo. In the
words of the manifesto, only “from above” – whether from
God or Tsar is unclear – could “institutions be improved,
defects remedied, and abuses reformed” (Anderson, 1987,
170). Nicholas remained emotionally involved with the
Decembrist events throughout his reign, which would
subsequently reject any notion of political liberalization
and deal harshly with groups and individuals deemed
threatening to the Tsar’s unfettered power.
While it would therefore be accurate to describe Nich-
olas as conservative or even reactionary, Nicholas did
introduce something new into ofﬁcial Russian political
discourse and ideology: nationalism. Nationalism, of course,
was a powerful force in the French Revolution, and
throughout the 19th century it emerged in different guises
in a variety of environments. Our interest is less in the socio-
economic conditions that gave rise to nationalism or itsvarious strains (e.g. civic versus ethnic nationalism).4
Rather, the key point is that the main thrust of nation-
alism, as it developed in the French Revolution and in
Europe in the early 19th century, was popular sovereignty,
which was combined with “concepts of individual liberty
and rational cosmopolitanism” (Kohn, 1944, 329). In other
words, the national community – however this was pre-
cisely deﬁned – was rightfully endowed with political
power. This was exempliﬁed in the French revolutionaries’
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen which
stated that “the principle of sovereignty resides essentially
in the nation; no body of men, no individual, can exercise
authority that does not expressly emanate from it.” Their
revolutionary anthem, the Marseillaise, called for the
“enfants de la patrie” to “irrigate the soil” with the “tainted
blood of tyrants” (Lakoff, 2011, 135). Throughout the ﬁrst
half of the 19th century, nationalism would be invoked as a
liberating force – in Greece, in Poland, in France, in Italy, and
in the revolutions in the “springtime of nations” of 1848.5
It should be clear, therefore, that nationalism, in this
respect, would not be attractive to a tsar such as Nicholas
that claimed supreme political authority. At the same time,
however, he could not completely ignore it: it played a role
in the Decembrist rebellion, was the primary force behind
the Polish revolt, and was gaining currency in Europe. His
post-Decembrist manifesto, while not “nationalist” in
intent, nonetheless posited a role for the people, albeit one
that required loyalty to the tsar. Put differently, the
connection with the tsar would deﬁne what it meant to be
Russian. In this way, the tsar would be a central ﬁgure
deﬁning the political community itself. Nationalism, origi-
nally developed as a liberating force, would be tied to the
autocrat in Russia.
Nationalism played an important role in maintaining
Nicholas’ rule. In 1833, Nicholas I’s newly appointed Min-
ister of the Department of Education, Sergei Uvarov, sent
out his ﬁrst decree, which would later become known as
Nicholas I’s policy of Ofﬁcial Nationality, the ﬁrst case of a
tsar sponsoring an explicit state ideology since Ivan IV
(Hosking, 2001, 267). The decree stated “Our common
obligation consists in this that the education of the people
be conducted, according to the Supreme intention of our
August Monarch, in the joint spirit of Orthodoxy, Autocracy,
and Nationality ” (Riasanovsky, 1959, 73). This three-
pronged policy, a conscious counterpart to the Liberty,
Equality, Fraternity troika of the French Revolution, was a
reactionary attempt to legitimize the pre-existing autoc-
racy in the framework of a liberalizing social climate.
Orthodoxy meant devotion and adherence to the
Russian Orthodox Church. Christianity provided the basic
historical framework for the ofﬁcials of Ofﬁcial Nationality,
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of Christianity, the Orthodox Church was the only form
seen as totally authentic (Riasanovsky, 1959, 85). This
underscoring of the importance of religion was partially a
rejection of the eighteenth century religious skepticism of
the European Enlightenment, the dangerous product of
which was strongly on Nicholas’s mind with the revolu-
tionary ethos already infecting Russia. Nicholas believed
that in order to suppress these dangerous ideas, people
needed to receive a more attentive home education on
proper morals and character, which were to be deﬁned by
the government. Moreover, the Russian Orthodox Church
(ROC) was also essentially subservient to the state, diluting
the possibility of Orthodoxy’s signiﬁcance as an indepen-
dent force. Henceforth, the ROC would play a strong hand
in teaching obedience to authority, whether it be to tsar,
ofﬁcer, or landlord. Because religion was already a domi-
nant phenomenon, the ROC provided a very convenient
network for the dissemination of state interests and values.
Ofﬁcial Nationality’s second pillar, autocracy, was the
most straightforward of the three. It was essentially a
proclamation against any discussion of constitutional gov-
ernment. There was to be no political role for the Russian
people, and no change in the status of most Russians as
serfs. In the latter aspect, Nicholas found an ally with the
nobility, who naturally wanted to preserve their control
over the serfs. Its proponents justiﬁed it both with refer-
ence to Russian history as well as negative views about
human nature in general and the capacities of the average
Russian in particular. Mikhail Pogodin, a prominent histo-
rian whose father had been a serf, was a strong proponent
of state power (gosudarstvennik) and supporter of Nicholas’
autocratic reign. He contended that “the Russian people is
marvelous, but marvelous so far only in potential. In actu-
ality, it is low, horrid, and beastly” (Tolz, 2001, 78). The
aforementioned Uvarov believed that Adam’s fall was the
“key to all history” and man’s essential wickedness
required autocratic rule (Anderson, 1987, 174). Nicholas
himself embraced a pessimistic view of the capabilities of
most Russians (Riasanovsky, 1959, 99). These ideas were all
employed to present the benign tsar, a gift from God, as the
essential glue that held Russian society together. Lastly,
autocracy was not just the clearest of the three points, it
was the only one that offered any real solidifying force for
the people of the Russian Empire; everybody could identify
as a subject of the tsar, regardless of creed or ethnicity.
Nationality (narodnost) was the vaguest of these three
terms and potentially problematic in a multinational em-
pire in which many of the leading ofﬁcials were ethnically
German. The addition of this term, however, acknowledged
a role for the Russian people (narod) as well as the inﬂuence
of ideas of nationalism within Russia. If it were not for this
ﬁnal point, the whole policy would have been a direct
replication of the mentality behind the Holy Alliance of
Nicholas’ predecessor, Alexander I. The Holy Alliance
contextualized the superiority and necessity of monar-
chical rule within a heavily religious framework against
liberal, constitutional ideas, but Nicholas did not leave it at
that. There had to be an answer offered to the nationally-
oriented dissent that shocked Nicholas’s early years as
tsar. Ofﬁcial Nationality’s third point, as Geoffrey Hoskingexplains it, “was an obeisance to the latest developments in
European culture, a pale reﬂection of post-French revolu-
tionary nationalism” (Hosking, Russia, 267). By including
this element, Nicholas’ government could claim recogni-
tion of the will of the people without having to provide any
institutionalized route for the expression of public opinion.
In other words, it was politically hollow compared to the
original intention behind Western conceptions of nation-
alism, which was largely directed against monarchical
power. In Russia, nationalism took on a cultural, Romantic
cast, manifested in intellectual and artistic projects (e.g.
landscape painting) to foster notions of national unity and
bridge the massive gap between the landed elite and the
peasantry (Ely, 2002, 134).
This is also the period in which the well-known Slavo-
phile versus Westernizer debate was born, with the former,
inspired by Herder’s ideas of a distinct mission for various
peoples, imbuing the narod with unique, praiseworthy at-
tributes. Attempts to express these ideas were often met
with resistance from Nicholas’s government, which tried to
oversee developments in the various debates over what
constituted the basis of Russian identity.While Nicholas had
more afﬁnity for the Slavophile perspective (which like him
celebrated the Orthodox faith), he could not fully embrace a
perspective, that by celebrating the common Russian per-
son, could potentially promote their political empowerment
and thereby challenge the autocracy’s role as the absolute
identity for the Russian Empire. In this vein, the only con-
crete virtue of the Russian people that ideologists of Ofﬁcial
Nationality supplied was humility (smirenie), “best man-
ifested in the people’s voluntary acceptance of the unlimited
powers of the tsar” (Tolz, 2001, 78). For its part, the state,
personiﬁed in the tsar himself, had, according to Uvarov, “all
means necessary to know the extent of world-wide prog-
ress in enlightenment and the actual needs of the Father-
land” (Anderson,1987,176). Therewas no room and no need
for popular sovereignty. Historical studies on Nicholas have
thus usually seen Ofﬁcial Nationality’s third point, nation-
ality, as simply an appendage to autocracy, tied to the his-
torical development of the Russian state and used to justify
an ostensibly benevolent, autocratic rule over docile,
obedient subjects (Riasanovsky, 1959, 124). In this respect,
the development of Russian nationalism under Nicholas
reﬂects Greenfeld’s observation that “the underlying ideas
of nationality were shaped andmodiﬁed in accordancewith
the situational constraints of the actors, and with the aspi-
rations, frustration, and interests which these constraints
generated” (Greenfeld, 1992, 15).
To conclude our discussion of Nicholas, there are two
central points. First, for Nicholas I, nationalism served an
important function. It was a means to legitimate his rule by
connecting him directly to the people. In so doing, he
emphasized an organic tie between ruler and ruled while
breaking down some of the feudal and agrarian bonds of
the old order. In this sense, Ofﬁcial Nationality also served
the cause of “right-wing modernization” (Allensworth,
1998, 39). However, from the Tsar’s perspective, nation-
alism, as some Decembrists had envisioned, could not be
imported wholesale without changes. Thus, the key was to
reformulate it in such a way to graft it onto pre-existing
ideas and support his right to rule. In this regard, an
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whowas able to deﬁne the Russian nation in his own terms
and carve out a space for himself as an indispensable part of
the narod. After the suppression of the Decembrists, there
was no effective countervoice within Russian civil society
to challenge the Tsar.6 Thus, in contrast to other parts of
Eastern Europe, which were, in Kohn’s terms, also in a
“backward stage of social and political development”
(Kohn, 1944, 329) where nationalism developed among
intellectuals and often assumed a more cultural and ethnic
hue, Russian nationalism under Nicholas assumed a statist
character.7 Just as the Russian state was by necessity
associated with economic development in conditions of
“backwardness,” it was also able to (re)deﬁne and direct
nationalism, a revolutionary concept born in Western
Europe and connected to political liberalization and
empowerment of the people, for its own conservative cause
of supporting autocratic rule.
4. The (re)deﬁning of nationalism and democracy
under Putin
Nicholas’ notion of nationality remained inﬂuential
throughout the Tsarist period, with the Tsar serving as the
kindly but occasionally stern father (batyushka) to the
Russian nation. The Romanovs’ legitimacy, however,
increasingly came under attack in the late 19th and early
20th century. The overthrow of Nicholas II in 1917 and
subsequent seizure of power by the Bolsheviks and crea-
tion of a Soviet state that emphasized class identity led to a
re-deﬁnition of nationality, one that eschewed religious or
ethnic markers and instead sought to create homo Sovieti-
cus. This project, of course, ultimately failed, in part due to
ethnic nationalist mobilization by the peoples of the Soviet
Union. For post-communist Russia and the other Soviet
successor states, the 1990s would be a trying period, one in
which various ideas were employed in the cause of nation
and state-building.8
In 2000, Vladimir Putin stepped into this breach, one
that he later acknowledged was a “deep, systemic crisis”
(Putin, 2012). The Russian economy had collapsed in the
1990s and many believed that Russia itself was at risk of
political disintegration. Representative, liberal democracy –
a foreign idea imported from the West – had been tried in
the 1990s, but by the end of the decade many Russians
associated the idea of democracy with political, economic,
and social failure.9 Putin, like Nicholas, was a restorationist.6 For example, Alexander Pushkin, Russia’s greatest literary talent, who
had connections to the Decembrists, was a supporter of the monarchy
and was the “only hope for orderly progress” (Schapiro (1967), 56).
Nikolai Gogol, whose writings pointed to numerous faults in Russian
society, also supported autocracy (Anderson, 1987, 174).
7 Russiﬁcation, based on a more ethnic concept of Russian (russkii)
identity, would later become more prominent in the second half of the
19th century.
8 For more on debates over Russian nationalism in the post-communist
period, see Allensworth (1998) and Laruelle (2009). For a volume that
emphasizes aspects of state-building, see McFaul (2001).
9 Many works have examined the weakening of democracy and civic
participation in Russia. For a comprehensive empirical approach, see Fish
(2005).Just as Nicholas wanted Russia to put the Decembrist revolt
behind it, Putin sought to move Russia out of the multidi-
mensional crisis generated in the ﬁrst decade of post-
communism. Putin, however, could not simply re-impose
the Soviet order. A return to full-ﬂedged authoritarianism
absent of any democratic trapping would have been both
costly and difﬁcult. Like nationalism in the early 19th
century, democratic norms and expectations could not
simply be rejected out of hand or ignored. Putin himself, for
example, acknowledged in a widely-cited December 1999
manifesto, “Russia at the Turn of the Millennium,” that
despite all the problems of the 1990s “we have to value the
beneﬁts of democracy to Russia” (Putin, 1999). Much like
how Nicholas I faced a crisis and was forced to respond to
emerging Western norms of popular sovereignty vested in
the abstract will of the nation, Putin had to do so again, this
timewith respect to democratic popular sovereignty, which
was essential to the government’s domestic and interna-
tional legitimacy.10 Like Nicholas, he would have to be
creative in employing new, potentially threatening ideas, to
his conservative cause.
Putin’s rule, of course, rested on a number of bases,
including oil and gas wealth, coercion, corruption, and his
own personal charisma.11 He also added powers to the
already “super-presidential” Russian system. His approval
ratings remained high, in part due to tangible changes in
Russian society but also helped by state control over the
media. However, there was also an ideational aspect to
Putin’s rule that served to legitimize his statist approach to
governance. One of these ideas was linking nationalism to
the governing regime, re-animating some of the same el-
ements as Nicholas. Another was re-deﬁning democracy in
such a way that it would end up serving his statist project.
Putin, far more than Yeltsin or Gorbachev, has made ap-
peals to Russian nationalism. Russian nationalism, of course,
contains numerous elements, including at times strongly
xenophobic and anti-Western attitudes. There are also as-
pects of the civic (rossianin) versus ethnic (russkii) debate
over who constitutes the nation. For our purposes, however,
the key element is how nationalism has been deﬁned by
Putin and his allies to serve a statist, often authoritarian
agenda. Before even becoming president, for example, Putin
made this connectionwhen he proposed three fundamental
values for the Russian nation in his aforementioned 1999
“Turn of the Millennium”manifesto: patriotism, power, and
statism (Putin, 1999). These have clear similarities with
Russian nationalism as deﬁned by Nicolas I. Indeed, Laruelle
afﬁrms that “contemporary state nationalism [under Putin]
is directly inspired by the famous triptych ‘Autocracy, Na-
tionality, Orthodoxy’ formulated in the nineteenth century
by Sergei Uvarov” (Laruelle, 2009, 198).
The parallels begin with Putin’s conception of patri-
otism. This is deﬁned by Putin as pride in one’s country,10 Popular sovereignty is the notion that the people are the source of all
political power. The nation can be used to deﬁne the will of the people, or
under a democracy the people directly, or indirectly through represen-
tatives, vote on issues. For a more detailed theoretical analysis, see Yack
(2001).
11 Numerous works offer in-depth treatment on the foundations of
Putin’s regime. In addition to Fish (2005), see Shetsova (2005).
12 See coverage in New York Times and Washington Post, 6 March 2012.
13 Reuters, February 8, 2012.
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past would therefore play an important role in Putin’s
nation- and state-building project. Thomas Parland, a
Finnish expert on Russian nationalism, notes that “the new
post-Soviet state administration could not appear ex nihilo
but had to establish itself, at least partly, in the context of
earlier historical experience and time-honored attitudes”
(Parland, 2005, 187). There is, perhaps, nothing remarkable
or exceptional about this. However, it is how history is used
and framed that is important. As noted previously, in the
case of Nicholas I the Ofﬁcial Nationality policy invoked
history in such a way that portrayed Russians as passive or
incapable of self-rule and the Tsar as a father/savior of the
nation. It did not empower the people. Similarly, Putin’s
notion of patriotism looks ﬁrst and foremost to the state
and existing political authorities, grounded in a narrative
that would be familiar to Nicholas I. Putin does not believe
the Russian people are capable of growing civil society on
their own and that they must therefore be stimulated by
the state (Evans, 2008, 904). Putin, looking back on his
options in 2000 when he assumed power, noted that due to
the lack of democratic institutions and a weak civil society,
he was “forced” to restore authority and power to the state
(Putin, 2012). In 2008, in a speech that echos many of the
sentiments of Nicholas, he stated that “from the very
beginning, Russia was created as a super-centralized state.
That’s practically laid down in its genetic code, its tradi-
tions, and the mentality of its people” (Evans, 2008, 903).
This use of history is employed to justify Putin’s vertikal of
power that has centralized authority in the hands of the
president and to uphold the legitimacy of the idea of
“managed [upravlayemaia] democracy,” discussed more
below. The net effect has been to reinvigorate old Russian
paradigms of the humble nation bowing before an
authoritative ﬁgure.
Unlike Yeltsin, who rejected the Soviet period as a black
hole in Russian history (Medvedev & Shriver, 2000, 252),
Putin has borrowed freely from the Tsarist and Soviet past,
mixing aspects of both with more contemporary elements.
For example, the Soviet national anthem was revived for
use as the national anthem of the Russian Federation, but
the lyrics were rewritten to remove all traces of communist
ideology while emphasizing Russian greatness. Interest-
ingly, themelody for the Soviet anthemwas borrowed from
a popular patriotic opera from Nicholas I’s reign that pre-
miered in 1836, “A Life for the Tsar.” There are other ex-
amples in post-Soviet Russia of this blending of various
periods in Russian history: the ofﬁcial national emblem
combines the red backdrop of the Soviet ﬂag with the
double-headed eagle of the tsars; the white-blue-red ﬂag
from the tsars was revived for use as the ﬂag of the Russian
Federation; military ﬂags have kept elements of those used
in the Soviet military; and new holidays that connect in
some fashion to the past were created and given state
support, as seen with the “Patriotic Birth” project in Vla-
dimir Lenin’s birth place.
In addition to preserving continuity with the past,
Putin’s notion of patriotism has also emphasized the need
for unity, exempliﬁed in his party, United Russia. The
collapse of the Soviet Union left the Russian people in a
complicated identity crisis, which was left inadequatelyresolved by the time Putin came to power. Without a sin-
gular, accepted paradigm for the people to see themselves
in, various viewpoints were espoused by different parties
and groups, and, as noted, there was a perceived risk of
national disintegration. Putin viewed this as inherently
dangerous. He noted that his ﬁrst challenge was “creating
the country’s unity [and the] establishment of sovereignty
of the Russian people, rather than the supremacy of in-
dividuals and groups, across its entire territory” (Putin,
2012). This is a very organic, singular view of the nation,
one that rejects pluralism. It is one, like the idea of na-
tionality under Nicholas, that elevates “the people” in an
abstract sense, but one that rests upon a leader who will
create national unity. Those who offer opposition, he has
suggested on multiple occasions, lack patriotism, are allied
with foreign agents who seek the destruction of Russia and
thus are outside the parameters of the nation. A vote for
him, as he suggested in his 2012 presidential victory
speech, is a vote for “Great Russia” and against those who
wish to destroy Russian sovereignty.12
Special mention should be made here of the prominent
public role given to the ROC, under Putin, as this has clear
analogs with Nicholas’ use of Orthodoxy. The ROC, of
course, was repressed under Soviet times, forced to take “a
Faustian position with the state,” that helped to legitimize
the Soviet system (Billington, 2004, 158). This further
weakened the ROC as a separate institution by allowing
itself to become even more subservient to the will of the
state than it was under the Tsars. The ROC, however, has
survived. According to surveys taken in the early 2000s,
between 70 and 80 percent of the population identify as
Orthodox, which is just under the number of citizens who
identify as ethnically Russian. However, only 40–60 percent
of the population believes in God, which means that there
is a signiﬁcant number of people who identify as Orthodox
but more in a cultural than theological sense (Laruelle,
2009, 161).
Putin’s regime has made a clear attempt to call upon the
ROC for legitimacy. In fact, the relationship between the
state and the ROC could be said to be mutually beneﬁcial.
Each provides the other with legitimacy. The ROC offers
strong support for state ofﬁcials, thereby giving leaders
legitimacy in the eyes of a self-identifying Orthodox pop-
ulation. For example, in February 2012 Patriarch Kirill
called Putin’s rule in the 2000s “a miracle of God” that
corrected that “crooked twist of our history” in the 1990s.
He dismissed the “shrieks” of those who protest against
Putin.13 In turn, the state offers moral and legal support to
the ROC. In 2004, Putin remarked that “the process of
reunifying the Russian Orthodox Church is muchmore than
a process internal to the Church; it is the symbol of the
rebirth and the reuniﬁcation of the Russian people itself”
(Laruelle, 2009, 168). Putin even goes so far as to say that
the two pillars of national and state security are nuclear
deterrence and Orthodox faith (Laruelle, 2009, 169). His
2012 election manifesto listed as a goal “preserving and
upholding the spiritual and cultural values that contribute
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recognizes the importance of the ROC.14 Putin endorsed
legislation that makes it difﬁcult for non-indigenous re-
ligions to register or acquire land or building permits,
thereby eliminating much competition for the ROC. Putin, a
former KGB ofﬁcer, presents himself as a true believer and
appears regularly in public with ROC ofﬁcials. He is not only
establishing continuity with the Russian past but also
imbuing his rule with moral/cultural legitimacy. Vladislav
Surkov, a top Kremlin aide, even suggested in 2011 that
Putin was “sent by God” to save Russia – a clear echo to the
Tsar as savior motive that one ﬁnds throughout Russian
history.
The second element in Putin’s “Turn of the Millennium”
manifesto was power, deﬁned primarily as the place and
greatness of Russia in the world. For centuries Russia as a
great power maintained prominence in images of
Russianness and was used to legitimize the rulers. While
Nicholas I’s Ofﬁcial Nationality did not include any explicit
mention of Russia as a great power, it was implicit in the
nature of his reasons for developing the policy. Nicholas
was acting tomaintain Russia’s power abroad by tightening
domestic control. Putin has struggled to regain former
power abroad by doing the same thing. By the time Putin
became president, the country had lost all claims (except
nuclear arms and a UN veto) to great power status. He does
not hesitate to remind the Russian people of this; he calls
the collapse of the Soviet Union the “greatest geopolitical
catastrophe of the twentieth century” (Liñán, 2010, 168). As
noted, he casts the 1990s in Russia as a very bleak time,
which the people of Russia can easily agree with. So when
Putin came to power he cast himself as the strong leader
answering the call for a return to Russia’s former glory.
Putin ﬁercely maintained the importance of seeing
Russia as a major player in global politics. An excerpt from
his “Turn of the Millennium” manifesto demonstrates this:
“Russia was and will remain a great power. It is precondi-
tioned by the inseparable characteristics of its geopolitical,
economic and cultural existence. This determined the
mentality of Russians and the policy of the government
throughout the history of Russia and this cannot but do so
at present” (Putin, 1999). The signiﬁcance of this great
power abroad was given sacred context as far back as 1510,
whenMuscovy was seen as a “Third Rome” and amessianic
role was applied to Russia as the harbinger of Orthodoxy to
the rest of the world (Bassin, 1999, 45). Putin played up that
notion but instead of Orthodoxy as the idea to be spread by
Russia’s greatness, it is modernity and democracy, albeit of
a Russian nature, that the Russian Federation stakes as its
prerogative in the other post-soviet states known collec-
tively as Russia’s ‘near abroad.’ Without holding Russia to
be a great power, the previously emphasized interest in
garnering national pride and state centered patriotism has
no natural path upon which to progress.
Finally, there is the notion of statism, which, has already
been implied, is the primary leitmotif of Putin’s project and
has the clearest parallel with the Ofﬁcial Nationality14 “Program 2012-2018” at available at www.putin2012.ru, accessed
May 23, 2012.ideology of Nicholas. The state is central in Putin’s view for
a number of reasons: it ensures Russia’s place in the world;
it provides internal stability; it uniﬁes the people; and it
has historical resonance. Putin, in his “Turn of the Millen-
nium” manifesto, was very clear about the importance of
the state.
It will not happen soon, if it ever happens at all that
Russia will become the second edition of say, the US or
Britain, in which liberal values have deep historic tradi-
tions. Our state and its institutions and structures have
always played an exceptionally important role in the life of
the country and its people. For Russians a strong state is not
an anomaly which should be got rid of. Quite the contrary,
they see it as a source and guarantor of order and initiator
and main driving force of any change. (Putin, 1999)
Where does democracy ﬁt into this? As noted, Putin
does not expressly reject democracy, and, unlike Nicholas,
he does not publicly justify or praise autocracy. Indeed, in
2012 he noted that “any innovation must strengthen the
democratic character of our state” (Izvestia, 2012). Ironi-
cally, the context of this quote was defending a law that
would increase the ﬁnes for those engaged in street pro-
tests. The irony, it seems, is lost on him. Rather, under Putin,
Russian leaders have embraced particular, modiﬁed ver-
sions of democracy, ones that, they would contend, better
reﬂect Russian history and/or Russia’s current situation.
The two most well-known versions are “sovereign [suver-
ennaia] democracy” and “managed [or guided] democracy”
(Anderson, 2007; Petrov, 2005). Sovereign democracy, as
deﬁned by Kremlin adviser Vladislav Surkov, is a system in
which “political powers, their authorities and decisions are
decided and controlled by a diverse Russian nation for the
purpose of reaching material welfare, freedom and fairness
by all citizens, social groups and nationalities, by the people
that formed it” (Surkov, 2006). While this conception has
clear parallels with ideas of the nation and popular sover-
eignty that developed in the 18th and 19th centuries, what
is notable in the Russian context is that this concept has
been employed to emphasize state power (e.g. Russia is
sovereign and will not be subjugated by other powers) and
to justify an essentially one-party system that can repre-
sent the “diverse Russian nation” far better than smaller
groups that will focus on more particular, not national,
interests. “Managed democracy,” which rests on central-
ized presidential power, control over the media, and
employment of numerous resources to manage and control
elections, is an even more puzzling concept, as it begs the
question of who should be “managing” democracy and how
the “sovereign” will of the people can be represented if
democracy is managed by some other force. Of course, if
one assumes that there is a harmonious, organic connec-
tion between the rulers and the ruled, the paradox is less
pronounced. Still, even Dmitri Medvedev, speaking in 2006
before he became president, found something peculiar
about the attempts to modify democracy. He noted, “If you
take the word democracy and start attaching qualities to it
that would seem a little odd. It would lead one to think that
we’re talking about some other, non-traditional type of
democracy” (Medvedev, 2006).
Indeed, we are. To return to the observations earlier in
this paper from Gerschenkron about “backwardness” and
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a foreign practice and adapting to it in such a way that
serves and strengthens the state. It includes the basic
element of the original concept (e.g. elections) but it has
been twisted in such a way that it is barely recognizable.
Just as Nicholas I used an idea – nationalism – connected to
political liberalization to further his statist and authori-
tarian system, one sees Putinmodifying democracy to serve
similar purposes. What is particularly noteworthy, how-
ever, is that Putin himself claims that Russia should adopt
“best practices” from abroad. For example, when discussing
a law to increase ﬁnes for illegal street protests, he cites
regulations on protests in Western democracies and the
clear need to maintain order. However, this law, in
contemporary Russia, is clearly designed to silence those –
labeled as “radicals” – who disagree with him (Izvestia,
2012). As seen in this example, an idea from abroad is
once again takenwith the aim of empowering the state and
disempowering Russian society.
5. Conclusion
In comparing Vladimir Putin to Nicholas I, this paper
gives substance to more generic comparisons between past
and contemporary Russian leaders as well as demon-
strating a pattern in the globalization of political thought.
As ideas spread and norms begin to take root in civil soci-
ety, governments cannot wholly ignore them. They are
required to respond, lest they risk losing legitimacy and,
consequently, inﬂuence and power. In the case of Russia, a
country that has traditionally had to play catch-up with the
fore-bearers of modernity, Western norms have espoused
political liberalization and subsequently challenged the
very nature of Russian political rule. Popular sovereignty in
the form of national will, as spread by the Napoleonic
conquests, came to disrupt the fabric of Russian society at
the dawn of Nicholas I’s reign. Similarly, popular sover-
eignty in the form of democratic representation came to be
perceived as a threat to the unity and stability of the
Russian Federation at the beginning of Vladimir Putin’s
presidency. In both cases, the head of state, operating
within the rhetorical parameters of the norms they were
deﬂating, reconﬁgured notions of popular sovereignty to
inhibit the growth of civil society, thereby protecting their
roles as the center of the state, and the state’s role as the
center of society. Both Nicholas and Putin were able to do
this, in part, because of the “advantage of backwardness”
that allowed them to see how these norms might develop
and take hold before it happened in Russia.
In this way, the Russian state has been able to distract its
citizens from the undemocratic nature of Russian society by
equating Russianness with love, respect, and the need for
authority. However, there is no guarantee that such a
strategy will be successful in the long run. In the case of
Nicholas I, his statist approach, justiﬁed on grounds of
stability and modernization, was found wanting given
Russia’s defeat in the Crimean War. This debacle in turn
spurred a series of more liberal reforms (e.g. repeal of
serfdom) under Alexander II. Today Putin’s statist policies
are coupled with rhetoric about the need for moderniza-
tion. However, as seen during the 2011 and 2012 electioncampaigns, the Russian people have begun to express
discontent en masse with politics-as-usual and argue that
genuine modernization will require more political liber-
alization and freedom for civil society. During his ﬁrst two
terms as president, Putin was able to fend off threats ‘from
below’ in Russian society and build his popularity by con-
trasting his rulewith the chaos of the Yeltsin years andwith
the help of systemic factors such as high oil prices. How-
ever, it is debatable if he can now easily co-opt or repress
the protests led by younger, middle-class Russians who are
aware that in political terms their country is well out of step
with international norms of democratic practice. Put
somewhat differently, Putin’s statist approach contains
self-contradictions, as the ability of a corrupt Russian state
to deliver reform andmodernization can easily be doubted.
If and when the bubble that has sustained Putin to date
pops, like with the Crimean war that coincided with the
end of Nicholas’ reign, Putin may come to regret the lack of
democratic and sustainable reform that characterizes his
leadership.
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